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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It is commonly acknowledged that upon presentation of
a verbal

item, a certain amount of information concerning

the item is stored in memory for later utilization.

This

representation in memory is often referred to as a ''memory
trace".
Whereas few authors would disagree that the term
"memory trace" refers to the memory of an individual event,
the exact nature of the event's representation has been a
continual point of argument.

It would seem to be the case,

however, that whatever its nature, a memory trace must
represent different facets of experience surrounding an
item's presentation.

Thus, as an example, subjects may

report the temporal aspects of an item's presentation
(Hintzman

&

Block, 1971), the modality within which items

are presented (Hintzman, Block

&

Inskeep, 1972), and the

frequency with which items are presented (Underwood,
Zimmerman

&

Freund, 1971).

Hence, Underwood (1969),

Wickens (1970) and others have suggested that the memory
trace for a verbal event consists of a variety of different
attributes or features that represent these varying facets
of the psychological experience.

The present report

investigates the nature of the memorial

information that

enables subjects to specify the modality within which a
verbal event has occurred.
1

2

-

The Modality Attribute
Wallach and Averbach (1955) noted that individuals

may report the manner in which they recall

information.

Some, for instance, report that they recall words by sound,
whereas others s tate that they r e c a 1 1 such i n for rna t ion i n
script or print.

These experiences, apparently shared by

many individuals, simply testify to the fact that information processing may occur through the various sensory
modalities.

With regard to verbal material, for instance,

usually the auditory (A) or visual
Hence,

(V) modality is involved.

it seemed reasonable to Wallach and Averbach that an

experience of a verbal event in one modality may differ
from the experience of that same event in another modality.
Wallach and Averbach further argued that if this is indeed
the case, then it would be 1 ikely that each type of experience results in a particular type of memory trace.
The notion that verbal

items presented in the A

modality are coded in a different fashion from that of
items presented in the V modality has been tested in a
number of different paradigms.
purposes, however, are:

(a)

Most relevant for present

investigations demonstrating

a release from proactive interference (PI)

in short-term

memory; and (b) experiments investigating the retention of
modality information
Release

per~·

from~

following

shifts~

modality.

Wickens (1970, 1972) has reported data from a number of

3

experiments intended to uncover the possible dimensions
along which verbal

items may be encoded.

The general

technique employed in these investigations has been the
short-term memory paradigm developed by Brown (1958) and
Peterson and Peterson (1959).

In the Brown-Peterson

paradigm, subjects are first presented triads of verbal
materials (words, letters, etc.).

Following a period of

distractor activity, usually lasting from 12 to 20 sec.,
recall

is required.

Performance is increasingly impaired

within two orthree such trials due to the
PI

(Keppel

&

Underwood, 1962).

that this build-up of PI

11

build-up 11 of

Wickens (1970) suggested

is contingent upon the items in

successive triads being encoded along the same dimension.
Thus,

if items on a later trial are somehow encoded differ-

ently from those presented on earlier trials, there should
be little interference from the earlier presented items.
The net effect of this shift in the encoding dimension
should be to produce a recovery or

11

re1ease 11 from PI;

performance should approximate that seen in the first few
trials of the experiment when little PI

is evident.

If A and V items are encoded differently, a ••release••
effect should be obtained when the shift in the encoding
dimension is from A to V or vice-versa.
and Gavalek (1971)

Hopkins, Edwards

tested this prediction using anrmal

names as stimulus items and visually presented arithmetic
problems as the distractor material;

These authors found

4
that although a

11

release 11 effect was obtained when the

shift trial was in the A modality and the preceeding trials
were in the V modality, the complementary effect, obtaining
a PI

release when the shift trial was in the V modality

and the preceeding trials were in the A modality, was not
evident in the data.

Such a result is not consistent with

the expectation outlined above.

That is,

if modality is

an encoded dimension of memory, a release effect would be
expected whenever the shift trial comprised a presentation
in a modality different from that employed in previous
trials.
Hopkins, Edwards and Cook (1973, Experiment II)
demonstrated that the previous inconclusive results
regarding modality shifts were due to the fact that the
distractor problems were always presented in the V modality.
In particular, these authors showed that a release from PI
would results whenever material presented on the shift
trial was in a modality different from both the modality
within which previous items had been presented and the
modality within which the interpolated task was presented.
That is, a release from PI was obtained when both the
to-be-remembered material and the distractor material were
presented in a different modality than the material
presented in the release trial.
Kroll, Bee and Gurski

(1973) suggested another

reason for the failure of Hopkins et al.

(1973) to obtain

5
a release effect when shifting from the A to the V modality.
In particular, they argued that subjects may not have had
sufficient incentive to encode V items in a fashion
morphic with their presentation modality.

iso-

Kroll et al .,

by having subjects repeat aloud (i.e., shadow) a series of
spoken letters as the distractor activity, were able to
demonstrate the predicted release from PI.

The authors

pointed out that a presentation of an item in a given
modality may not result in subsequent encoding by subjects
in a fashion consistent with the presentation modality.
Further, they noted that this difficulty may not always be
of equal
modality.

importance for presentation in the A as the V
In particular,

it was suggested that subjects

will often use some form of acoustic or auditory coding
even when the items are presented visually.

The importance

of this suggestion with regard to the retention of modality
information will be discussed in a later section of the
present paper.
The retention of modality information.

Recent

evidence indicates that subjects are able to maintain a
discrimination between modalities over several minutes.
The general procedure in these experiments has been to
present subjects with a 1 ist of items, half in the A
modality, and half in the V modality.

Following 1 i·st

presentation, subjects are given either a paced or unpaced
test comprised of the items previously piesented on the

6
study list

( 11 old 11 items), and

study 1 i s t

( 11 new 11 i t ems ) •

items not presented on the

The sub j e c t s a r e s u b seq u en t I y

required to make a decision as to whether each
presented in the V modality,
presented (NP)

the A modality, or was not

on the study I ist.

mance are of interest:
modality judgment; and

(a)
(b)

item was

Two measures of perfor-

the probability of a correct
the probability of a correct

modality judgment conditional

upon

latter measure supposedly takes

item recognition.

The

into account the possibility

that recognition performance may not be equal

for A and

V it ems .
Bray and Batchelder (1972) employed the above
procedure while manipulating retention
an

interval

(either

immediate test or a test following a 15 min. delay)

and providing either intentional or incidental

instructions

regarding the later test for modality information.

Prior

to the modality identification task (MI), subjects recalled
as many

items as they could from the 30 item study 1 ist.

With respect to the Ml

task,

probabi 1 ity correct modality

judgments were above chance for both the A and V modalities.
There were no significant effects of either retention
interval or instructions.

There was, however, a significant

interaction between modality and retention
that Ml

performance for V items

retention interval whereas Ml
not.

interval

such

increased over the 15 min.

performance for A items did

When using the conditional measure of performance,

,-.
7
although A items were correctly identified more often than

v

items, the interaction of modality with retention interval

was not significant.

Again, there was no effect of in-

tentional versus incidental tasks.
Hintzman, Block and Inskeep (1972, Experiment I)
presented subjects eight word-lists, each list consisting
of 18 items presented one time each.

Following presenta-

tion of each

1 ist, subjects free-recalled as many items

as possible.

After recall of the last list, subjects were

presented the 144 items from the eight 1 ists in addition
to 16 NP items.

The same type of Ml task as used by Bray

and Batchelder was employed except that test items were
also presented in either the A or V modality.

Similar to

the results obtained by Bray and Batchelder, Hintzman
et al.

(1972) found that subjects were able to discriminate

A from V items at a level exceeding chance.

Further,

subjects were more accurate in discriminating modalities
for words they had recalled previously than for those that
had not been recalled.

This latter result, however, was

due to the fact that recalled V items were identified as
having been presented in the V modality with greater probability than non-recalled V items.

There were no sig-

nificant effects due to the modality within which an item
was tested.
In two other experiments, designed to measure retention
of information within modalities, Hintzman et a1.

(1972)

8

found that subjects were also able to discriminate on a
retention test between items that had been presented .in
upper-case block letters from items presented in lowercase script letters (Experiment II), and between items
presented in a female voice and those presented in a male
voide (Experiment Ill).

The latter effect has been con-

firmed by Light, Stansbury, Rubin and Linde (1973).
Several experiments have demonstrated that subjects
are also able to distinguish between items presented twice
in the same modality from those presented twice but in two
modalities.

Madigan and Doherty (1972)

presented subjects

with a study list where items were presented either once
in the A modality, once in the V modality, twice in either
the A or V modality (AA and VV items), or once in each
modality (AV and VA items).

Following present.ation of the

study 1 ist, subjects free-recalled the items and also
indicated the mode in which each recalled item was presented in the study 1 ist. ·The subjects made accurate judgments of not only how many times an item had been presented
in a given modality, but also the ordering of the modalities.
That is, subjects. were able to remember that an A presentation

preceeded a V presentation and vice-versa, and

were able to discriminate these mixed modality items from
items that had been presented either once or twice in a
single modality.

Similar results have been obtained by

Macey and Zechmeister (1973) when testing memory for
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modality following item recall, and by Hintzman, Block
and Summers (1973) when testing memory for modality
immediately following study.
In sum, the results of the experiments reported
above indicate that subjects do,

in fact,

retain a great

deal of information concerning the manner in which to-beremembered ·items were presented for study.

Further,

subjects are able to retain such information without special
instructions concerning the nature of the memory test.
With respect to a modality attribute, the results reviewed
above provide strong evidence that modality is an encoded
dimension of memory.

However, the manner in which modality

may be represented in memory remains a topic for further
discussion.

CHAPTER I I
THE REPRESENTATION OF MODALITY INFORMATION
It is clear that subjects are able to discriminate
between A and V items at the time of a memory test when
this information is required within 15 min. of the study
trial.

The manner in which modality information is repre-

sented in memory over this period of time, however,
clear.

is not

Specifically, either of two general hypotheses

can account for subjects• ability to report the modality
within which an item was presented for study.

One hypo-

thesis suggests that memory for modality is the result of
retrieval of information from an abstract code that is
merely a description of the circumstances,

including the

modality in which the item was presented, surrounding an
item presentation.

A second hypothesis suggests that

memory for modality is the result of retrieval of the
information contained in a physical code that for present
purposes may be 1 ikened to an auditory or visual

image.

The remainder of the present chapter will be concerned
with distinctions between these two hypotheses.
The distinction between the two hypotheses outlined
above can best be drawn by distinguishing two classes of
general theories of human memory.

One current class of

theories emphasizes differences between various memory
stores (e.g., Atkinson

&

Shiffrin, 1968; Norman, 1968).

Generally speaking, these theories suggest that an item
10

11

is first represented in a sensory memory, according to
whether the item was presented visually (iconic memory,
cf. Neisser, 1967), or auditorily (pre-categorical acoustic
storage, cf. Crowder
all

&

Morton, 1969).

It is assumed that

information from the sensory memory stores is lost

within a very short period, at most several seconds.

In

order that information might be retained for periods of
time longer than several seconds,

it has been suggested

that items enter a short-term store or primary memory
which is fundamentally

11

auditory-verbal

11

(Shiffrin, 1970)

in terms of the nature of the stored information.

Decay

from the short-term store is seen as being relatively
rapid unless the item is actively rehearsed.
has become useful
11

Hence,

it

to term the short-term store as a

working memory•• (Sperling, 1967).

Information to be

retained over longer periods of time is assumed to be transferred to a long-term store through rehearsal processes.
The rate of decay of information in the long-term store
is assumed to be negligible.
A critical feature of multi-store theories is the
assumption that sensory features of the item presentation
are low within a short period of time.

A mechanism that

might account for memory for modality is not, therefore,
immediately obvious.

At the same time, however,

it has

been suggested (shiffrin, 1970) that the long-term store
can be considered to be organized

a~cordlng

to modality.

12

Hence,

it may be the case that modality judgments are the

result of subjects knowing the organizational principle by
which an item in question is stored in memory.

Further,

as such an organizational principle could itself be considered to be of an

11

abstract 11 nature,

it could be argued

that modality information is represented in memory as an
abstract proposition or principle representative of a
certain class of items.
Various viewpoints similar to the conceptualization
discussed above have been presented in the 1 iterature.
Murdock (1968), for example, has suggested that A and V
items each enter a different short-term store from which
information is transferred to long-term memory.
the case,

If this is

it could be that the resultant trace in the long-

term store contains information concerning from which shortterm store the item was transferred.

Ultimately, such

information could be used as the basis for modality judgements (cf. Underwood, 1969).
As an alternative to the multi-store conceptualization,
Craik and Lockhart,(1972) have suggested that items may be
characterized as being represented in memory at any one of
a number of different levels of processing.

According to

the authors, the different levels of processing may In
turn be characterized as being synonymous with different
features of the item, and with different rates of forgetting.
For example, semantic features are seen by the authors as
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conducive to long-term retention with a rather slow rate of
forgetting, whereas acoustic characteristics of the item
are seen as susceptible to greater decay, and hence are
viewed as being synonymous with faster rates of forgetting.
Similarly, Posner and Warren (1972) have suggested
that an item may be represented in memory by a number of
different codes, some of these pertaining to the physical
properties of the item presentation with others relating to
the phonemic and semantic properties of the item.

Accord-

ing to the authors, all of these codes may simultaneously
represent the item in memory.

Performance in a given task,

however, may depend upon the retention of a particular type
of code, and the authors point out that by maintaining this
particular type of code in memory, the retention of other
codes may suffer.

Within the conceptualizations offered

by Craik and Lockhart (1972) and Posner and Warren (1972),
then,

it may be the case that performance on a modality

judgment task is contingent upon retrieving the physical
code or that part of the memory that represents the physical
features of the item as originally presented.
Each class of theories presented above thus suggests
an alternative hypothesis with respect to the nature of the
modality representation in memory.

One hypothesis suggests

that upon presentation of an item, the subject takes notice
of the modality, and this experience is subsequently stored
in conjunction with other aspects or attributes of that item.

14

This hypothesis does not delimit the stage in information
processing at which the information is abstracted.

The

second hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that, upon
presentation of an item, a memory trace analogous to a
physical code or image is stored in memory, the information available in such a code serving to later identify
input modality (Hintzman, Block
Modality~

''context".

&

Inskeep, 1972).

Anderson and Bower (1972)

have suggested that the various aspects of item presentations, such as

11

•••

where in space the item was presented,

who said it, how it was said, and other special characteristics of its physical and psychological presentation (p.99)"
become associated with the members of the subjec's lexicon
and thus serve as "markers" which enable subjects to distinguish between items presented on the list from those
that were not presented.
Anderson and Bower's model has a considerable amount
of intuitive appeal, since it is clear that the items employed in the typical memory experiment are already known
to the subjects.

It is the subject's task to discriminate

between items presented on the study 1 ist from other members
of his vocabulary and then retrieve these items.
important for present purposes, however,

What

is

is that these

models suggest that the information which enables the subject to discriminate "old" from "new" items is of an abstract nature.

Thus, Anderson and Bower state:

15

Upon presentation of a word in study, we assume that
the sensory features of that word activate the node in
the (memory} network that corresponds to the word.
Simultaneously, there are active in the network nodes
corresponding to the various contextual stimuli that
the subject is attending to.
(p. 103)
Bower (1972) further states:
1 think of this psychological context as being produced
by the free flow of the "stream of consciousness'', the
internal monologue as the subject describes to himself
what is going on around him, and comments upon or free
associates his descriptions.
(p. 93)

These "marker" theories of discriminative memory
suggest that the subject's ability to report the modality
within which an item is presented for study is contingent
upon retrieval of the stored "contextual" information,
which is abstract or propositional
Modality~

represented~

in nature.
physical codes.

It is

clear that judgments concerning the physical properties of
an item presentation do not constitute evidence for either
the abstract code or the physical code hypothesis.

If the

physical code is to be I ikened to some sort of mental

image

or "literal copy" of the original stimulus presentation,
however, then it is necessary to demonstrate that the
physical attributes of the stimulus as remembered are isomorphic with the physical properties of the stimulus as
perceived.

Put in other terms,

it is important to deter-

mine whether the internal representation of a memorial
image is analogous to the internal representation of a
typical perception.

Thus, the question here concerns the

nature of the proposed image rather than the function of

16
the image (Cooper

&

Shepard, 1973).

One major method has been utilized to demonstrate
the existence of a visual code that can be likened to a
visual

image.

This method has dealt with the selective

facilitation of reaction times when the stimulus as
remembered is within the same format as the test stimulus.
Posner, Boies, Eichelman and Taylor (1969) suggested that
when subjects are required to respond whether or not two
letters are the same, the time to make such a response
will

reflect the type of information required to make a

"match''.
that,

This suggestion was based on the assumption

if the physical aspects of a letter are in storage

at the time of test, subjects' reaction times would be
faster when the letter in memory and the test letter were
in the same case than when the memory letter was in the
upper-case the test letter was in the lower-case or viceversa.

That is, a relatively faster match would be expect-

ed when both letters are physically identical and no
11

name 11 code is required for comparison than when letters

are physically different and subjects would have to go
through a process of generating a code which represents
the name of the letter before making the required comparison.
The authors found results confirming this expectation.

It

should be noted, however, that the relative efficiency of
the physical match over the name match decreased over the
period of 2 sec.

17

In a similar experiment, Parks, Kroll, Salzberg
and Parkinson (1972) found that the greater efficiency of
a nominally defined physical match was evident over a
period of at least 8 sec. provided that subjects were
given some incentive to code visual

items in a manner that

was isomorphic with their presentation.

This was accom-

plished in their study by having subjects engage in an
auditory shadowing task prior to and following presentation
of the memory letter.

In addition to finding the same

degree of relative efficiency in terms of mean response
time (RT) as did Posner et al.

(1969), the greater retention

interval employed yielded sufficient data in terms of
errors to demonstrate that subjects made fewer errors in
matching when both the memory and the test letter were in
the same case.
Unfortunately, since the relative efficiency of the
physical code comparison over the name code comparison was
found to be evident only over an 8 sec. period,

it is

difficult to argue that subjects employ the information
available in a physical code in making modality judgments
after 15 min.

However, as Posner et al.

(1969) state:

It is difficult, however, to say whether this loss in
relative advantage of a physical match corresponds
closely with loss in the ability to state whether the
letter was upper- or lower-case.
It is possible that
subjects who show no faster reaction time for physical
than name identity would be able to recall better
than chance the case of the letter.
Indeed, the information required from the visual representation for a
fast RT might be greater than would be required in order

18

to tell whether the letter is upper-case or lower-case.
It is conceivable that a very seriously decayed visual
representation would still be sufficient, given unlimited time, for subjects to retrieve information concerning the case of the letter (p. 14, italics added).
If the Posner et al.

(1969) assumption is correct, then it

should be the case that given a retention interval of
several minutes, subjects should still be able to report
whether visually presented verbal
upper- or lower-case letters.

items were presented in

As was mentioned above,

however, the abi 1 ity to report presentation modality does
not distinguish between alternative hypotheses concerning
the nature of the modality representation.
Hintzman, Block and Inskeep (1972) argued that

if

the information available in a physical code does play an
important role in item retrieval, then subjects should be
more accurate in recognition decisions when study and test
items are presented in the same physical format than when
the study and test items differ along some physical dimension.

To test this hypothesis, the authors (Experiment I I)

presented subjects with a 1 ist of items in which half of
the items were presented in large upper-case block letters
and half were presented in small

lower-case script letters.

The test procedure employed was similar to that used in
the modality identification task outlined earlier.
ically, half of the subjects were presented the test

Spec ifitems

in upper-case block letters, whereas the remaining half of
the subjects were presented the test items in lower-case
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script letters.

As predicted, subjects were more accurate

in recognizing test items when the items were present·ed in
the same physical format as they had been presented in the
study 1 ist.
In a replication of the Hintzman et al.

(1972,

Experiment II) experiment, Hintzman and Summers (1973)
found similar results with respect to recognition performance and also showed that subjects' reaction times were
faster when study and test item representations were in
the same physical

format than when they were not.

Kirsner (1974) found that subjects'

Similarly,

recognition decisions

were faster and more accurate when items were presented
auditorily or visually on both occasions than when they
were presented in different modes on the two occasions.
It may be noted that the results obtained by Kirsner (1974)
and Hintzman and Summers are similar to those of Parks
et al.

(1972) and Posner et al.

(1969) who investigated the

retention of physical codes of single letters only over
brief retention intervals.
While the evidence presented thus far is rather
com p e 1 1 i n g w i t h res p e c t to the rna i n ten an c e of v i s u a 1 and
auditory information in a literal format,

the results of

several of these studies remains equivocal.

In particular,

while Kirsner (1974) and Hintzman, Block and Inskeep (1972)
found evidence for selective facilitation in recognition
performance when items were presented in the same physical
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format on both study and test occasions, this pattern of
results was not evident for modality judgments taken.
conditional upon item recognition.

Thus,

if modality

judgments are to be postulated as being the result of
retrieval of information available in a code that is a
111

iteral

11

copy of the original stimulus presentation, the

evidence remains unclear.

The remainder of the present

paper, then, deals with the nature of representation issue.

CHAPTER I I I
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE RETENTION OF MODALITY CODES
The data reviewed in the previous chapters are
inconclusive regarding the manner in which the information
utilized by subjects in making modality judgments is represented in memory.

However,

if modality information is

represented in terms of physical codes,

it is of some im-

portance to study the retention of auditory and visual codes
independently.

It may be the case, for example, that

auditory and visual codes have different characteristics
of decay and/or are susceptible to different types of
interference.

Unfortunately, previous experiments inves-

tigating the retention of modality information are not
suitable for the independent evaluation of auditory and
visual.modality codes.
The reader may remember that the modality identification task used by Bray and Batchelder (1972) and
Hintzman, Block and Inskeep (1972) consisted of having
subjects classify each test item as to whether it was presented in the V mode, the A mode, or was not presented (NP)
on the study 1 ist.

It is possible in such a design that

subjects choose between the three classifications by means
of a two stage decision process.

Specifically, s-ubjects

may first decide as to whether the item was or was not
presented on the study list on the basis of some type of
information not relevant to judgment of modality.
21

It this

I•

li

I

22

is the ease,

t~en

the subject•s next task is to decide

whether the item was presented in the A or V mode.

Con-

ceivably, subjects could do so on the basis of the presence
or absence of a particular type of modality code.
for example,

Thus,

if subjects encode only A items in a manner

isomorphic with presentation modality, subjects could
determine whether or not an item was presented in the A
modality on the basis of retrieving the A code for the test
item.

If an A code were available in memory, the subject

would choose the A classification; if an A code were not
available, the subject would choose the V classification.
Hence,

it would not be necessary for subjects to retain

modality information for V presented items.

Conversely,

it could be the case that subjects choose among the three
test classifications on the basis of an attribute appropriate to recognition decisions and the presence or absence
of a visual code.
An alternative to the above description of subjects•
decision processes is that subjects• recognition decisions
are not independent of modality judgments.

Specifically,

subjects• willingness to accept an item as having been
presented on the study 1 ist may be dependent upon the knowledge the subject has concerning the modality in which an
item was presented.

Thus,

if a subject does not know the

modality an old item was presented in, he may be more
willing to say that the item was not presented.

To the
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extent that modality information is differentially available for A and V items, such a decision bias might mask
differential performance on a modality judgment task for
A and V items.
The interpretive difficulties outlined above suggest
that several considerations be kept in mind.

First,

it is

desirable to separate the recognition aspects of the procedure from the modality judgment task.

Second,

it is

necessary that the retention of A and V codes be measured
independently and in such a fashion that the dominance of
a given modality can be apparent.

The influence of each

of these considerations may now be outlined in terms of
the particular test procedure employed in the present
experiments.
The general procedure.

Each subject in Experiments

I and II was presented a study 1 ist where half of the items
were presented in the A mode and half were presented in
the V mode.

Following presentation of the study 1 ist, a

test booklet was given to the subjects which was composed
of pairs of items printed in one column, the letter
11

11

A11 or

V11 printed in a second column, the words ''yes'' and "no"

printed in a third column, and the numbers one through
five printed in a fourth column.

The pairs of words pre-

sented in the first column were obtained by pairing each
word that had been presented in the study 1 ist with an item
not previously seen by the subjects. in tlie experiment.
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The subjects were informed that only one word from
each pair actually had been presented in the study li.st.
The subjects were then instructed to:

(a) circle the word

they felt was presented on the study list;
or

11

(b) circle ••yes••

no 11 with respect to whether they felt the item thus

chosen from the pair was presented in the modality questioned in the second column (A or V); and (c)
confidence in their

11

indicate their

yes/no•• decision by circling one of

the five numbers (1-low, 5-high).

The reasoning behind

this choice of procedure with respect to the difficulties
inherent in previously used designs is as follows.
First,

it should be apparent that by having subjects

make their recognition decisions prior to making modality
judgments, the temporal confounding of the two tasks inherent in other designs is avoided.

Since

su~jects

are

forced to choose that item which is most fami 1 iar to them,
there can be no bias to reject an

item as having been pres-

ented on the study 1 ist due to a lack of knowledge concerning modality of presentation.
Second, the use of the yes/no procedure to measure
memory for modality instead of the modality classification
procedure as employed in previous studies allows for the
possibility that subjects might feel

that a given item was

not presented in one modality while at the same time not
being wi 11 ing to say that it was presented in the other
modality.

This procedure allows for the possibility that

25
the information available to a subject might be sufficient
to reject that an item was in one modality while at the
same time allowing the further possibility that the same
information might not be sufficient to determine whether
the item was presented in the other modality.

Put in other

terms, the measurement of subjects' willingness to say that
an item was presented in the A modality, for example,

is

independent of the measurement of subjects' willingness
to say that the same item was presented in the V modality
It should be noted that this procedure does

or vice-versa.

not circumvent the possibility that subjects might employ
only one type of modality information in making decisions
concerning both modalities.

Rather,

it ensures that the

measurement of responses made to questioning concerning
one modality is independent of the measurement of responses
concerning the other modality.
The Measurement

£t

Modality

Given that differences between memory for the two
modalities might exist,

it is necessary that appropriate

measures be available for uncovering such differences.
The design as outlined thus far circumvents only part of
the problem.

The remaining difficulty to be dealt with

is the manner in which individual subject's response biases
are to be handled.

It is necessary to determine,

in some

fashion, whether any effects that might be apparent. in the
data are truly the result of differences between memory
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for the two modalities and not due to differences

in re-

sponse biases toward one modality or the other.
Typically, those experimenters concerned with the
problem of response bias have resorted to one of several
means to handle the problem.

Perhaps most prevalent has

been the use of the measures of the theory of signal
detection (TSD; Green
difficulties.

&

Swets, 1966) to obviate any

One of the significant tenets of TSD is

that a consideration of sensory discrimination should be
made separately of considerations of response bias.

The

TSD measures of discrimination and bias (d' and Beta
respectively), have direct analogs in the present design.
Specifically, analogous to the probability of a "hit" in
TSD is the probability of correctly identifying the modality
as questioned.

Thus, an "auditory hit" can be classified

as the probability of correctly identifying an item as
having been presented in the A modality when questioned
about the A modality.

A "visual'' hit rate can be determined

by calculating the probability of a subject correctly
classifying a V item as having been presented in the V
modality when questioned about the V modality.

Thus,

as in signal detection theory, "hits" may be identified
as "correct" identifications associated with ''yes" responses.
Similar procedures can be employed to determine the
probability of an A or V "false alarm".
o f r e s p on d in g

11

The probability

yes 11 wh en a s ked wh e t h e r a v i s· u a 1 i t em wa s
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presented auditorily, for instance, can be used to determine
an A false alarm rate, while the probability of responding
"yes" when asked whether an A item was presented visually
can be used to determine a V false alarm rate.

Given these

measures, the A and V hit and false alarm rates respectively,
it is then possible to derived' for each modality.
One difficulty with this conceptualization is that
any difference between modalities in terms of the d' measure
is confounded with presentation modality.

That is, .5!_' for

the A modality is determined on the basis of classification
of both A and V i terns, and hence,

it is necessary to assume

that a subject's response to a query concerning a given
modality

is the result of his checking his memory only

for information concerning that modality.

As was mentioned

earlier, however, while the present method assures independence of measurement,

it is not possible to specify

the type of information utilized by subjects in making
decisions concerning a specific modality.
An alternative to the d' analysis is to treat
modality of presentation and type of error (Miss vs.
False Alarm) as main effects in an Analysis of Variance
while using the probability of an error as the dependent
variable.

That is, there are two types of errors that a

subject may make.

One involves incorrect modality judg-

ments when a "yes" response is appropriate (following the
terminology of TSD, hereafter terme9 a "Miss" or M).

The

J.
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other type of error involves responding ••yes" when "no" is
app-ropriate (a "false alarm" or FA).

A difference in the

type of error which is consistent across subjects would
thus be indicative of any particular bias; a bias to
respond "yes" would be demonstrated if the probability of
a FA exceeds the probability of aM, whereas a bias to
respond "no" would be apparent in a greater M than FA rate.
This suggested analysis is similar in some respects
to one recently proposed by Underwood (1974) who suggested
that the relative difference between the two types of errors,
i.e.,

(M- FA)/(M +FA),

TSD measure Beta.

is highly correlated with the

This,· of course, would be expected if

the relative difference between the two error rates does,
in fact,

reflect criterion differences.

Thus, on the surface, the above mentioned form of
analysis has at least some degree of intuitive appeal

in

that criterion or response bias differences may be treated
independently of sensitivity differences or main effects.
At the same t i me , however , the r e i s one f 1a w i n the proposed design that may not be readily apparent.

Specifi-

cally, any interaction between error type (M versus FA)
with the modality questioned (A or V)

is confounded with

the ma i n effect of present at ion mod a 1 i t y.

Thus, FA's

and M's are made in response to different questions concerning modality of presentation.
any differential

Clearly, therefore,

response bias in the tendency for a given
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subject to believe that items were presented in any one
specific modality might either mask, or unduly bias, .an
interpretation that a difference between the modalities
indeed exists.

li

One possible means to overcome this difficulty

I~
.. 1.1'.

I!

would be to derive some measure of modality bias that would

:1

be independent of any true differences between the modal-

',,'

ities.

One possible measure would be to compute the

relative difference between the M and FA rates as analyzed
separately by each modality questioned.

Such a measure

would be indicative of both a subject's bias to say "yes''
or

11

no 11 as well as the subject's bias to guess "auditory"

or

11

vis~al

11

•

The difference between the relative bias

measure computed for any given modality and an overall
bias measure, however, would yield some indication of
bias to respond A as opposed to V.

As shall be pointed

out in later sections of the present paper, there are
several behavioral consequences of this model of response
bias measurement that may be directly tested in the data.
Further specification of the measurements employed in the
present experiments shall therefore be delayed until
presentation of the appropriate results.

·~

I.

1i'
'I
·'

I!

CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENT I
The first experiment is concerned with the retention
of modality information as a function of the modality of
an interpolated task and the nature of the instructions
given to subjects prior to presentation of the study 1 ist.
The theoretical expectations and specifics of the experiment follow.
A series of studies by Segal and her associates
(Segal

&

Gordon, 1969; Segal

&

Fusella, 1970) demonstrated

that the act of generating an image in a specific modality
interferes with the perception of signals presented in that
modality.

Thus, Cooper and Shepard (1973) argued that

image formation utilizes much of the same information proc e s s i n g ma c h i n e r y t h a t

i s u s e d i n t h e a c t o f p.e r c e p t i o n .

Atwood (1971), dealing with material that subjects were
required to remember rather than merely "detect", found
similar results.

Specifically, Atwood found that a visual

distractor task engaged in by subjects during the learning
of a paired-associate task reduced recall of high-imagery
material but had less of an effect on highly abstract
material.

The implication of Atwood's results is that the

formation of mnemonic images while engaging in a visual
distractor task was difficult due to the shared information
processing machinery required in both tasks.
Evidence reviewed earlier (Kroll, Bee
30

&

Gurski, 1973;
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Hopkins, Edwards

&

Cook, 1973) suggested that whether or

not subjects retain visual

information for an item is.

dependent upon the nature of the task.

Specifically, these

studies demonstrated that a release from proactive interference (PI)

in the Brown-Peterson paradigm following a

change in input modality is contingent upon the modality
in which the distractor material

is presented.

In both

studies, a release from PI following a shift from A to V
presentations of the to-be-remembered items was evident
only when the distractor material was presented in the
A modality.

The imp] ication of these results is that the

nature of the modality of the distractor material as well
as the modality within which the to-be-remembered material
is presented determines the nature of the item encodings.
These results can be further related tQ those obtained by Parkinson, Parks and Kroll

(1971), and Parkinson

(1972) who presented subjects with a 1 ist of to-be-remembered letters embedded in a I ist of auditorily presented
shadow material.

These authors found that to-be-remembered

V letters were recalled better than to-be-remembered A
letters, and that interference in terms of phonemically
similar shadowed letters was found to affect recall only
for the A letters.

These results suggest that whether or

not subjects either encode and/or retain the physical
properties of V letters appears to be contingent upon the
modality of the interfering task.

In particular, these
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results suggest that subjects selectively rehearse and store
visual properties of to-be-remembered material only when it
is of some value to do so;

interference between distractor

material and to-be-remembered material

is minimized by

processing in different modalities.
The findings reviewed above have implications for
the study of memory for input modality.

In particular,

if

modality information is stored in memory in terms of physical
codes akin to mental

11

images 11 , memory for modality should be

contingent upon the modality in which interpolated distractor
material

is presented.

Consider, for example, a task where

between item presentations, distractor material
either in the A or V modality.

is presented

Under conditions of audito-

rily presented interpolated material, memory for the physical
codes of V items should be enhanced relative to when the
interpolated materials are presented in the V modality.
The opposite pattern of results should be expected for auditorily presented items.

If, on the other hand, modality is

represented in memory in terms of abstract codes, 1 ittle
difference should be apparent between the two types of
interpolated materials.

The above reasoning is based on

the fact that the interference from the interpolated
material would not be expected to differentially affect
the abstract codes representing the two types of items.
To test these implications, subjects in the present
experiment were divided into three groups as defined by the
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presence or absence of an interpolated task.

One group of

subjects simply viewed the study 1 ist as presented whereas
the remaining groups solved simple arithmetic problems
between presentations of to-be-remembered items in the
study 1 ist.

Of these latter groups, one group was presented

the arithmetic problems in the A modality while the remaining group was presented the distractor problems in the V
modality.
One further variable was manipulated in the present
experiment.

Specifically, one-half of the subjects were

instructed as to the nature of the modality judgment task
prior to the presentation of the study 1 ist, while the
remaining half of the subjects were only instructed that
their memory for the words would be tested.

As reviewed

earlier, Bray and Batchelder (1972) found no difference
between two groups of subjects instructed in this manner.
As was also noted earlier, however, the results of that
study are suspect due to the lack of independence between
A and V

judgments~

The present study may thus be viewed

as an attempt to replicate the Bray and Batchelder results.
If instructions to remember modality have no effect
on memory for modality,

it may be assumed that modality

codes are automatically established as part of a memory for
a verbal

item.

of instructions,

If, on the other hand, there is an effect
it may be suggested that

modality in.formation is a subject-control
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latter position is in 1 ine with the Posner and Warren (1972)
suggestion that the physical code for an item is one of a
number of codes that must be actively rehearsed at the
expense of other memory codes in order to become established
in long term memory.
Although the present experiment associates the null
hypothesis with the abstract or propositional code hypothesis, the present design permits a quantitative evaluation
of the model outlined by Anderson and Bower (1972).

As

was described earlier, Anderson and Bower term their model
"associative" in nature.

Essentially, with respect to the

present task, the model suggests that the probability of
the modality of a given item being remembered is a function
of the probability of the ••context 11 being established at a
unique

11

node 11 in memory and the probability that the infer-

mation thus established is associated with a memory node
representative of that item•s lexical properties in memory.
It is thus assumed that upon presentation of an item at the
time of test, encoding processes make for automatic access
to that item•s lexical node.

The probability of a

decision regarding the status of that item as being
or ••new••,
(a)

11

auditory 11 or

11

visual

11

11

correct 11
11

old 11

is thus dependent upon:

the probability that an association was estab.lished at·

the time of study between the memory node representing the
lexical properties of the item and the memory node representing the collective evidence (i.e., the abstract propo-

it

-
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sitions regarding the nature of the item's presentation);
and (b)

the a moun t of e v i den c e, or the number of pro p.o s i t ions

in memory that would permit such a decision to be made.
More formally,

the model claims two distributions

of evidence, f (x) and f (x).
u
m

The former distribution

denotes the distribution of contextual evidence in regards
to the modality questioned for distractor items and items
presented in the study 1 ist but not in the modality questioned.

The latter distribution represents the distribution

of evidence concerning items presented in the modality
questioned.
with

Both

parameters~'

di~tributions

are assumed to be binomial

the number of possible abstract proposi-

tions regarding modality in memory, and

e,

the probability

that a given proposition was formed at the time of study
list presentation.
It is further assumed that the subject makes his
decision as to whether an item was presented in a given
modality on the basis of the amount of information to that
effect in memory.

Letting a= the probability of associating

a proposition to an item's lexical node, the distribution
of evidence available to the subject at the time of test
for items actually presented in the questioned modality is

( 1)

f. (x)
1

=

a(f (x)) + (1 - a) (f (x)).
m
u

It may be noted that in practice the non-independent
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d istributions f u (x) and f m(x) are taken to be unit normal
with means 0 and urn respectively.
however,

The distribution f.i(x),

is generally not normal except for those instances

in which a= 1 (Anderson

&

Bower, 1972).

It is the tests

of the form of this distribution that permit quantitative
evaluation of the model by assuming that the distributions
f (x) and f.(x)
U

I

serve the same function as do the noise

and signal + noise distributions in the theory of signal
detection.
Method
Design.

Subjects in the present experiment were

presented with a I ist of words, half in the auditory (A),
and half in the visual

(V) modality.

The subjects were

divided into six groups depending on whether they were
g i v en s p e c i f i c or non -spec i f i c i n s t r u c t ions c o.n cern i n g the
nature of their memory test, and depending on whether they
solved visually presented arithmetic problems, auditorily
presented arithmetic problems, or did not engage in distractor activity.

The subjects were tested for recognition

memory by means of a forced-choice procedure and for memory
for modality by means of a yes/no procedure.
Materials and presentation of the study I ist.
total of 62 words was used in the experiment:
comprised the experimental

A

A set of 48

items; the remaining 14 items

were used as primacy and recency buffer items.

All

items

were two-syllable nouns occuring between 25 and 50 times

I.
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per million as indexed in Thorndike and Lorge (1944).
a given subject, 24 of the 48 experimental

For

items were to-

be-remembered items and the remaining 24 were test distractor
Since buffer items were also to-be-remembered items,

items.

each subject was presented a 1 ist of 38 to-be-remembered
items.
Presentation modality was a within-subjects variable.
Specifically, each subject was presented half of the 24
to-be-remembered experimental

items in the A modality, and

the remaining half in the V modality.

The A words were

recorded on magnetic tape in a male voice.

The V items

were presented as slides by means of a Kodak Carousel slide
projector synchronized with the tape recorder.

The slides

appropriate to V presentations were made of dry transfer
letters mounted on clear plastic and inserted .in slide
frames.

During the time an A word was presented, a blank

slide was projected.
intervals.

All

items were presented at 6 sec.

Each A word was spoken once at the beginning of

the interval comprising the presentation.
Each experimental

item was used equally often

a~ross

subjects as a distractor item in the test-list, and as a
to-be-remembered item in the study 1 ist.

Further, each item

was presented in the study list equally often in each modality.

Thus, four different study 1 ists were constructed.

The assignment of the experimental words to the 1 ist positions was random with the restriction that no more than two
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items in the same modality were presented consecutively.
Finally, one-half of the buffer items were

pr~sented

in the A modality, and one-half were presented in the V
modality.

The primacy buffer comprised 4 V and 3 A pre-

sentations, while the recency buffer comprised 3 V and 4 A
The same set of buffer items was used in

presentations.

all four study lists.
Presentation of distractor material and instructions.
Although A and V items were presented at 6 sec.

intervals,

V items were projected for a constant 2.2 sec.

The A items

were spoken once at the beginning of a comparable 2.2 sec.
interval.
ected.

During that interval, a blank slide was proj-

Following the intervals comprising item presenta-

tions, an .8 sec.

interval elapsed while the projector

changed s 1 ides.
Three of the 6 sec. between item presentations have
been accounted for.

The nature of the material

presented

to subjects in the remaining 3 sec. determined the classification of subjects into three groups.

For one group,

blank slides were presented in these intervals.

The

remaining groups were presented arithmetic classification
problems in either the A or V modality.

The type of

problem employed was that used by Hopkins, Edwards and
Cook ( 1973).

Specifically, for each problem, one of the

four signed digits from the pool -1, +1, -2 and +2 was
presented.

When a -1 or a -2 was observed, the subject

:
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was instructed to circle an
by the Experimenter.

11

A11 on a response sheet provided

When a +1 or a +2 was detected,. the

subject was instructed to circle a

11

8 11 •

Once again, since

the time needed for the projector to change slides was .8
sec., the problems were actually presented during 2.2 sec.
intervals.
Each of the three groups defined above were further
divided into two groups according to the instructions given
them prior to the presentation of the study 1 ist.

Specifi-

cally, one-half of the subjects were instructed to try and
remember as many words as they could for a later memory
test.

Thus, the nature of the test was left unspecified.

The remaining half of the subjects were instructed that it
might be useful

to remember the modality of presentation

since some of the groups in the experiment
what modality items were presented in.

wo~ld

be asked

Explicit instruc-

tions concerning the exact nature of the test were not
given.
Test procedure.

The test 1 ist comprised 24 pairs of

words typed in a single column on a one page test sheet.
In each pair was one word previously presented on the study
list (either an A or V word), and one word not previously
presented.

Subjects were instructed to choose for each

pair that word which they felt had been presented on the
study 1 ist.

Immediately following each forced-choice

decision, the subjects were asked to circle a

11

yes'' or

11

no"
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response to one of two questions as indicated on the test
S p e c i f i c a 1 1 y , f o r h a 1 f t he p a i r s , s u b j e c t s we. r e

sheet.

asked whether the item chosen from the test pair was presented in the V

~odal

ity, or whether the chosen item was

presented i n the A mod a 1 i t y i n the study 1 i s t .

T h i s res u 1 t-

ed in four types of test pairs which can be identified by
the combination of input modality (A or V) and modality
questioned (A or V).

An equal number (six) of each of the

four possible types of test pairs was presented to each
subject.

Finally, subjects were also instructed to circle

a number from 1 to 5 representing how confident they were
in their modality judgment.
Subjects.

Subjects were 96 undergraduate volunteers

from introductory psychology courses at Loyola University.
There were 16 subjects randomly assigned by

or~er

of appear-

ance to each of the six experimental groups.
Results
Recognition data.

As outlined above, forced choice

r e cog n i t ion d a t a based on 1 2 o b s e r v a t i on s i n each mod a 1 i t y
were available for each subject.

The mean recognition

probabilities by condition are given in Table 1.

As there

were 16 subjects assigned to each condition, each entry in
the table is based on 192 observations (16 subjects x 12
observations).

An Analysis of Variance for planned com-

parisons performed on these data indicated that recognition
performance was higher when subjects were presented the

41
Table 1
Proportion Correct Recognition
Instructions
Intentional
Modality
Condition
No-Task

A

v

Incidental
A

v

1!,

I

I

.88

.93

. 93

.92

A-Task

. 85

. 86

.85

.87

V-Task

.88

•9 1

.87

.87
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study 1 ist without having to perform an interpolated task

ex=

.92)

than when subjects engaged in the auditorily

(X= .86) or visually
task,

f (1,90) = 9.00,

(X= .88)
~

<.01.

latter two conditions was not

R <.05.

presented interpolated
The difference between the

significant,~

(1,90) = 1.68,

No other main effects or interactions were sig-

nificant.

The entire Analysis of Variance is summarized

in Table 1 of the Appendix.
Modality judgment performance.

A mean error proba-

bility was calculated for each subject conditional upon
correct recognition.
Table 2.

These probabilities are given in

It may be noted that in addition to the nature

of the interpolated task, nature of instructions, and
modality of presentation, type of error has been added as
an additional classification.

Specifically, as was out-

1 ined in Chapter Ill, a Miss (M)
error made when a
Alarm (FA)

11

refers to that type of

yes'' response is correct, and a False

refers to that type of error made when a

11

no 11

response is appropriate.
An Analysis of Variance indicated that the Modality
X Error Type interaction differed for those conditions where
no interpolated task was employed (condition No-task) as
opposed to where subjects engaged in an aural
visual

(V-task)

interpolated task, F (1,90)

=

(A-task) or

3.96, £. <.05.

This interaction reflects the fact that the subjects in the
No-task group had the same M and FA. rates (X= .21) for A

Table 2
Mean Error Probabilities by Condition
Instruction
Intentional
Modality
Error Type

Incidental

v

A

v

A

M

FA M

No-Task

.25

. 22 . 12

.29

• 18

.21 .22

.10

A-Task

.20

.30 .32

.29

.23

.26 .36

.33

·V-Task

.24

.32 .32

.29

. 25

.29 .23

.34

FA

M

FA

M

FA

Condition

,J::-

w
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items and approximately equal M and FA rates (X•s = .18 and
. 1 9 r e s p e c t i v e 1 y ) f o r V i t ems , wh i 1 e s u b j e c t s i n t h e .A - t a s k
and V-task groups committed more FA's (X= .30) than M's
(X= .23) for A items with no difference (X 1 s = .31) for
V items.

The comparison between the V-task and A-task

groups in terms of the Modality X Error Type interaction
was not significant,

f. (1 ,90) = 1.55, £.

> .05.

One further comparison was significant.

The lnstruc-

tions X Modality X No-task vs. A-task+ V-task interaction
was significant, F (1,90) = 4.48, £. < .05.

There were a

greater proportion of errors under the intentional than
incidental

instructions for both modalities in the No-task

groups with a greater difference (.13) for A items than
for V items (.04).

For the A-task and V-task groups, there

were a greater proportion of errors under

inci~ental

in-

structions for A items (X difference = .06) with 1 iteral ly
no difference under the two instructional conditions for
V items.

The Modality X Instructions interaction was not

significant for the A-task versus V-task groups comparison

(f.<

1).

There were no other main effects or interact1ons.

The entire Analysis of Variance is summarized in Table 2
of the Appendix.
At the present level of analysis, it appears that the
11

1 iteral copy 11 or physical code hypothesis is not supported

by the data in that the predicted interaction between presentat ion modality and modality of interpolated material was
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not obtained.

Conceivably,

it may be argued that the fail-

ure to obtain the hypothesized effect is due to differential
response bias between conditions since, as was argued earlier, tnodal ity of presentation and any possible modality bias
are confounded in the present design.

One possible means of

circumventing this difficulty would be to derive some measure of modality judgment performance that would obviate
differential

response biases.

In order to do so, however,

it is necessary to develop a quantitative measure of subjects•
response biases so that each subject's performance scores
might

appropriat~ly

be corrected.

Beta, the signal-detection theory measure of response
bias, describes the tendency for a subject to say
opposed to

11

11

yes 11 as

no 11 in relation to his attempts to optimize

his performance.

In terms of the present data,

it is

possible to derive Beta for each modality by treating the

'!!

III
ill
,,:1
I

probability of a subject correctly saying

11

yes 11 when asked

whether a V item was presented in the V modality as a V
11

hit 11 , and by treating the probability of a subject saying

11

yes 11 when asked whether an A item was presented in the V

modality as a V false-alarm.

Consultation of the appropriate

tables (cf. Hochhaus, 1972) enables a direct computation of
Beta.
Underwood (1974) has offered another measure of
response biases.

In particular, Underwood suggested the use

of the ratio of the difference between the number of M1 s and
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FA•s divided by the sum of the two measures ((M-FA)/(M+FA))
as a valid indicant of subject's criterion.

As evidence

for his claim, Underwood reported perfect rank-order
correlations between the derived measure and Beta.
Several tests of the viabi 1 ity of the present extensian of Underwood's formulation were made in terms of the
present data.

First, correlations between Beta and the

(M-FA)/(M+FA) measure were computed based on data gathered
separately for each modality questioned.

Both product-

moment and Spearman rank-order correlations were computed
(see Table 3).

With 14 ~. a product-moment correlation

of .497 and .623 are required for significance at the .05
and .01 levels respectively.

As can be seen, the present

values ranged from .58 to .87 with an average of .72.

As

the present distributions of Beta were curvil tnearly related
to the (M-FA)/(M+FA) measure, these values are somewhat
conservative.

Thus, the Spearman rank-order coefficients

ranged from .76 to .98 with an average of .91.

Hence,

it
;;

may be concluded that the (M-FA)/(M+FA) measure and Beta
are indices of essentially the same phenomenon.
A second test of the present conceptualization stems
from the intuitive observation that a score representing an
auditory bias should be negatively correlated with a score
representing a visual bias.

In order to test this hypothesis,

it is necessary to achieve some measure of overall bias that
is common to both modal itles.

One such measure is the

I

I

i

li!

,,
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Product Moment Coefficients and Spearman

,,

"

"

Rank-Order Coefficients (In Parentheses)
Instructions
Intentional
Modality

A

v

Incidental
A

v

Condition
No-Task

.82(.94)

.76(.98)

.64(.98) .83(.98)

A-Task

.79(.94)

.67(.85)

.87(.94)

V-Task

.78(.93)

.58(.76)

.64(.88) .58(.80)

.66(.87)

48

jl
1',
I

j

(M-FA)/(M+FA) measure computed on data collapsed over the
A subtraction of this measure from the

two mod a 1 it i es.

',I

(M-FA)/(M+FA) measure computed individually for each modality

i'

questioned should then leave measures of A and V

response biases which are independent of the overall
tendency on the part of a subject to say
to ••no••.

11

yes 11 as opposed

These composite measures were, therefore, sub-

sequently computed for each condition.

Product-moment

correlation coefficients, computed on the resultant values,
are given in Table

4 for each condition.

As can be seen,

111:11'

IIIII:
,H!Iill

the values ranged_ from -.46 to -.89 with an average of -.65.
All but one of these correlations was significant.

Hence,

the present conceptualization appears to provide at least
moderately adequate measures of A and V response biases.
Using the values of the A and V

respon~e

biases as

computed above, two further measures were computed for each
subject.

Specifically, a composite measure of modality

judgment performance was obtained for each subject separately
for each modality by first obtaining the z-score for each
subject in each modality in terms of the distribution of all
192 possible scores (96 subjects X 2 scores).

Secondly,

a z-score for the A and V response bias measures was computed
separately for each subject based on the appropriate set
of 96 scores.

A total or composite score was then computed

for each subject by subtracting the z-score for the bias
measure from the z-score for the error measure.

.. a:

It may
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Table

4

Product Moment Correlations Between
Auditory and Visual

Response Bias Measures
Instructions

Intentional

Incidental

Condition
No-Task

- . 61

-.46

''
'I

A-Task

-. 75

-.64

'II

i:

V-Task

-.89

I

-.56
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thus be noted that this measure,
error,

like the probability of an

is negatively correlated with performance.

The mean

of this measure for each group is represented in Table 5.
An Analysis of Variance indicated that performance was significantly higher in the No-task as opposed to the A-task
and V-task groups,~ (1,90)

=

].32,

R

< .01.

effects or interactions were significant.

No other

The entire

Analysis of Variance is summarized in Table 3 of the
Appendix.
One further point is worth noting with respect to the
results of the

a~alysis

of the composite scores.

Specifi-

cally, the previously reported significant Instructions X
Modality interaction is apparently not the result of memory
differences between conditions, but rather is seemingly the
result of differential

response biases.

This·follows from

the fact that the same interaction was not significant when
considering the composite scores.
Thus,

it appears reasonable to conclude that the

failure to find an interaction between modality of presentation and modality of interpolated materials was not due
to a form of response bias that might have masked the predieted effect.
Tests of the Anderson and Bower Model
The mathematical model outlined by Anderson and
Bower (1972) was described in some detai 1 earlier.
reader may recall

The

that words not presented in the modality
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Table 5
Mean Composite Scores By Condition
Instructions
Intentional
Modality

A

v

Incidental
A

v

Condition
No-Task

-.38

-. 1 8

-. 14

-.60

A-Task

-. 12

+.23

+. 13

+.42

V-Task

+. 15

+.36

+. 11

+.02

,:'''li
~~i

:~l
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questioned are assumed to be represented by the normal
distribution f (x), and the words presented in the modality
u

questioned are denoted by the non-normal distribution fi (x).
(see Equation 1).
The quantitative test employed by Anderson and Bower
involves computing the probability that a word not presented
in the modality questioned is given a confidence rating
exceeding some

value~-

Each such value is then used to

provide an estimate of the standard normal deviate correspending to an appropriate criterion on the decision scale.
A chi-square minimization technique is then used to minimize
the difference between the obtained and predicted frequency
of confidence ratings using a, the probability of associating a proposition to the lexical node in memory, and u ,
m
the

me~n

of the distribution of items so associated as free

parameters.

It should thus be noted that the goodness of

fit test is essentially one concerning the form of the
distribution.
This same test was duplicated with the present data.
As subjects in the present experiment provided confidence
ratings from 1 to 5 on both yes and no responses, there
were nine criterion points as described above.

However,

as the number of responses was smal I in some of the confidence rating categories, the 10 categories were combined
into 5 broader categories resulting in 4 criterion points.
The-estimates of a and u

m

with the resultant chi-
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squares are presented in Table 6.

Also presented are the

results of evaluations of two alternative models:

The

standard signal detection model which assumes equal variance
of the noise and signal + noise distributions, and the signal detection model assuming unequal variances.

There is

one parameter to be estimated in the former case (u, the
mean of the signal +noise distribution), and two parameters
in the latter case (u; and cr, the standard deviation of the
signal + noise distribution).

There are 3 degrees of free-

dom for each test of the standard signal detection model
and 2 degrees of freedom for each test of the other two
models (5 frequencies - 1 - the number of parameters to
be estimated).
The results of the goodness of fit tests indicate
a moderately good fit for all three models.

In all cases,

there were only 4 out of 12 significant chi-squares at the
.05 level.

It should be noted in this regard that statis-

tical significance is not a very good test of the adequacy
of a mathematical model.

Atkinson, Bower and Crothers

(1965) have noted that significant chi-squares may be
expected whenever the number of observations is relatively
large.

Further, the few significant chi-squares reported

may also be the result of the fact that the chi-square
estimation procedure gives unequal weight to low
events.

Also,

p~obabil

ity

it should be noted that better fits might be

o b t a i n e d f o r a 1 1 t h r e e mod e 1 s i f t h·e c r i t e r i on p o i n t s we r e

Table 6
Parameter Estimes and Resultant Chi-Square Values
Standard One-Parameter
Signal Detection Model
Group

x

No-Task
Intentional
Instructions
A-mode
1. 78
V-mode
1. 7 7
lnci dental
Instructions
A-mode
1. 90
V-mode
1. 95

x

2

Anderson and Bower
Model

cr

X

a

)..lm

x2

12.86
7.45

2.25
1. 72

1. 74
0.94

1. 73
7.39

1. 00

2.46
1. 77

3.06
7.45

3.56
12.97

2.08
1. 96

1 . 27
1. 02

1. 85
12.96

. 93
.97

2.07
2.02

2.67
12. 74

2. 12
8.53

1. 34

1. 07

. 87

1. 87
7.37

1. 00

.90

1. 47

t. 82
8.53

2.52
5.65

1. 71

. 91

1. 25
1. 0 3

. 21
5.62

.86
1 . 00

1. 89

.90

.04
5.65

1 • 13
1. 11

6. 30
.96

1. 42
1. 11

1. 54
1. 04

. 05
. 91

.68
.99

1. 91
1. 11

.06
.96

1 . 22
1. 34

2.44
11 . 46

1. 16
1. 39

.82
1. 21

.59
9.29

1. 00
.92

1 . 22
1. 45

2.43
11 . 30

A-Task
Intentional
A-mode 1. 32
V-mode 1 . 02
Incidental
A-mode
1. 60
V-mode
.90
V-Task
Intentional
A-mode
V-mode
Incidental
A-mode
V-mode

x2

Two-Parameter
Signal Detection Model

.98

.78

1 . 02

V'1
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also treated as free parameters (e.g., Dorfman

&

Alf, 1968).

It is important to note that there is no clear advantage for any one model.

The failure to find a better

fit for the model proposed by Anderson and Bower (1972) can
be attributed in part to two specific causes.

First, values

of a close to unity, as were obtained in the present data,
result in

11

normal-like 11 f.(x)
I

distributions.

Second, as

the model actually refers to distributions of evidence
regarding individual

items, the effect of collapsing data

over subjects and items serves to make the f.(x)
1
tion considerably more symmetrical

than should ordinarily

be the case (Anderson & Bower, 1972).
therefore,

distribu-

Unfortunately,

it does not appear that a clear case can be

made for any one model over another on the basis of the
present data.
Discussion
The failure to find a modality-specific effect of
interpolated materials upon either recognition memory or

i,

memory for modality does not fit well with the ''literal
copy 11 or perceptual code hypothesis.
earlier in the present chapter,

As was out! ined

if an image-! ike 1 iteral

copy is the underlying representation mediating modality
judgments, then the modality specific encodings of the
to-be-remembered items would be expected to suffer when
the modality of the interpolated task was in the same
modality as the modal lty of item presentation.

~
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The reader may recall that both Kirsner {1974) and
Hintzman and Summers {1973) have argued that modality is
represented in memory in terms of the actual physical
properties of the item.

In both studies, superior perform-

ance was obtained in those conditions wherein the original
item presentation and that item's later test presentation
were in the same modality.
Summers argued,

As Kirsner, and Hintzman and

if such a test by study modality interaction

were not evident, the results would stand in favor of the
hypothesis that only the more abstract features of the
stimulus presentation were important in subjects• recognition decisions.

Some resolution of the discrepancy between

the presently obtained results and the conclusions of
Kirsner, and Hintzman and Summers would therefore seem to be
in order.
One resolution of this difficulty may 1 ie in an examination of the present procedure.

In particular,

it may be

the case that memory/test stimulus comparisons are performed
on the basis of physical codes of the item only when all the
various physical codes are available to the subject at the
time of test.

This is to say that subjects might employ

a physical code to compare test and memory representations
only when some consistency is maintained between study and
test modalities.

When the distinction between the modal-

ities is not maintained during test list presentation,
may be that subjects utilize some

................

a~ternative

............

~~·~

~

format of

it

r
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item representation (i.e., the abstract format) as a basis
upon which to judge the modality of the initial presentation.

Thus,

it may be the case that subjects have avail-

able in memory both an abstract or propositional code
conveying modality information and a more
as we 11 .

11

1 iteral

11

image

Presumably, the form of the code utilized in

judging modality would rest on, among other things, the
nature of the test procedure.
It may be noted that the proposed solution is not
altogether unlike that discussed by Anderson (1974) with
Anderson was

respect to memory for sentences.

interested

in whether sentences are maintained only in terms of content, or semantic features, or whether the exact syntactic
forms of the sentences are also preserved in memory.
Anderson presented subjects with a set of sentences to
study which were either in the active or passive voice.
Either immediately or following a delay of several minutes,
the subjects were then required to verify a second sentence
as to its truth based on the information previously presented

to them.

If true, the sentences were either

identical, or were the same in content but in a different
voice.

Anderson argued that if a verbatin,

image-1 ike

representation of the sentences were stored in memory, then
an interaction between voice of input and voice of test
presentation would be found.

In two experiments, Anderson

obtained this interaction with respect to both immediate

I
\,

o
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and delayed judgments.

The size of the interaction for

delayed judgments was, however, smaller than for immediate
judgments.

Further, Anderson found that the size of the

interaction correlated significantly (although modestly,
r

=

.39} with memory for the voice of the initial presen-

tation of the sentences.

Anderson thus concluded that both

perceptual and propositional

information is maintained

in memory.
Such a multiple process view of modality representation might also be used to explain several other results
with respect to memory for modality.

In both the Kirsner

(1974}, and Hintzman and Summers (1973} studies, an interaction between modality of test presentation and modality
of study list presentation was obtained only when considering
recognition data.

That is, this

interaction was not appar-

ent when considering modality judgment performance.
effect might be expected if

11

literal

11

This

information was used

in immediate judgmental processes, but higher order abstract
information was

u~ed

in the delayed modality judgments.

This interpretation gains further support from the fact that
in both the Kirsner, and the Hintzman and Summers studies,
reaction time data were being recorded which might seemingly
emphasize to subjects the need to base such immediate judgments upon a I iteral

information source.

A second hypothesis which may also resolve the
discrepancy between the present results and- the conclusions

r!
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of Kirsner, and Hintzman and Summers is that the effect of
the similarity manipulation is the result of some sort of
encoding facilitation rather than that of a memory comparison facilitation process.

That is,

it may be the case that

the effect of presenting an item in the same format that it
was originally presented in during the study 1 ist presentation facilitates the lexical encoding of the item during
its subsequent test presentation (Atkinson & Juola, 1974).
Further, as the effect of the similarity manipulation would
be on the initial stages of item encoding, modality judgments taken conditionally upon recognition judgments would
not be expected to be affected by the manipulation.

This

is to say that once the items are recognized, the modality
judgments would be the result of the retrieval of abstract
information.
It may be noted that a similar explanation can be
used with respect to Anderson 1 s (1974)

results.

Specifi-

ca11y, the fact that a larger interaction between voice of
input and test probe voice was obtained in the immediate

l

condition than in the delayed condition could be the result

I

of a greater encoding faci 1 itation in the former case.

I

It should be noted that the

11

encoding 11 hypothesis

described above thus admits to some form of a perceptual
code but denies that this perceptual code is representative
of some type of memory code.
e i t h e r t h e n o t i on o f a

11

Thus,

it should be clear that

d u a 1 - r e p r e s-en t a t i on 11 o r a n

11

en cod i n g -
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nfacil itation" hypothesis can explain both the salient
results of the present experiment and the results obtained
earlier by Kirsner (1974) and Hintzman and Summers (1973).
Finally,

it should be noted that the failure to find

an effect of instructions does not support or refute either
of the alternatives just presented.

This failure, however,

is consistent with the results obtained by Bray and
Batchelder (1972) and suggests that whatever the nature of
the code underlying modality judgments, the representation
is

11

automatically 11 established at the time of an item

presentation.

CHAPTER V
EXPERIMENT I I
In the present experiment, differences in modality
information for A and V items were examined as a function

'

of retention interval and several characteristics of the
nature of the materials employed.

The specifics and thee-

retical expectations of the experiment are detailed as
fo 11 ow s.
Memory for modality
teristics.

~ ~

function of word charac-

Both of the hypotheses out! ined in the previous

chapter suggest that the memory code mediating modality
judgments is, at least in some cases, abstract or propositiona1

in nature.

One potential difference between the

propositional form of representation and an image-! ike

J

I

perceptual code is the extent to which subjects would
have to process an item presented at the time of test
order to make an appropriate modality judgment.
cally,

in

Specifi-

if a subject is to judge the modality of an item on

the basis of the physical or literal aspects of the item
presentation, the comparison need not necessarily entail

I

1

accessing any of the lexical properties of the word itself
(Ki rnser, 1974).

If, on the other hand, a more conceptual

or abstract propositional representation

serves as the

basis for modality judgments, those characteristics which
might
a

11

strengthe~

or weaken the memorability of the item as

v e r b a 1 11 u n i t mi g h t 1 i k e w i s e b e e.x p e c t e d to a f f e c t t h e
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memorability of that item's presentation modality.
One purpose of the present experiment, therefore,
was to examine memory for modality as a function of two
widely investigated word characteristics.

The first of

these can be referred to as background frequency (Underwood,
Zimmerman

&

Freund, 1971), or the relative frequency with

which the item is found
per i o d i c a 1 s) .

in common sources of print (e.g.,

There a r e a numb e r of s t u d i e s ext an t

i n the

1 iterature (cf. McCormack, 1972) that indicate that recognition performance is higher for those items of low background frequency than for items of high background frequency.
Hence, on the basis of the reasoning presented above,

it

may be expected that memory for modality would also be
superior for low frequency words than for high frequency
words.
The second word characteristic to be studied is
the abstractness of the to-be-remembered words.

Atkinson &

Juola (1973), as well as Gorman (1961) have demonstrated
that concrete items are recognized better than abstract
items.

Thus,

if concrete items are more "memorable'' than

are abstract words, memory for modality can be expected to
be greater for concrete than abstract words.
Memory for
terval.

modality~~ function~

retention in-

It is not clear as to the length of time modality

information might be expected to remain as part of a memory.
As noted earlier, Bray and Batchelder (1972) found no
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evidence for either differential forgetting of modality
information for A and V presentations or any decrease in
overall accuracy of modality judgments over a period of
15 min.

It is, of course, necessary to examine memory

for modality over a retention interval sufficient to
demonstrate some loss in judgment accuracy if any hypotheses are to be tested concerning the etiology of the
loss.

To that end, subjects in the present experiment

were tested for memory for modality either immediately
after presentation of the study list or following a 24
hour delay.
Given that some Joss of modality information would
be expected to occur over a 24 hr. period, the second purpose of the present experiment was to test hypotheses concerning the cause of the forgetting.

Two general reasons

for an expected Joss can be advanced.
suggested that there would be some

I

I

information in memory.

11

First,

it can be

decay 11 of the modality

A second possibility is that the

Joss would be due to some form of interference.

Evidence

for the latter possibility is available in the results of
Hintzman, Block and Inskeep (1972) who compared modality
judgments for those items recalled on a prior free-recall
test with items not previously recalled.

The results of

that comparison indicated a positive bias toward responding
that the previously recalled words .had been presented in
the V modality.

This effect, of course, would be expected
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if there was some form of interference resulting from the
modality information formed as a result of the act of
writing responses during the free-recall

portion of the

experiment.
The manner in which interference might be expected
to occur during a 24 hr. delay between study and test might
be a function of certain characteristics of the subject's
experience with the to-be-remembered words during that
interval.

More specifically, during the extra-experimental

portion of the retention interval, the subject would be
expected to

enco~nter

some portion of the to-be-remembered

items in normal conversation and/or reading.
time of test, subjects

1

Thus, at the

memory for input modality might

be interfered with by his experience with the words during
the extra-experimental portion of the retention interval.
If such is the case, it should be possible to influence
subjects• modality judgments by means of variation in the

I

I
I
I

word pools from which the to-be-remembered items are
selected.

In particular,

it would seem reasonable to

suggest that the probability of encountering the to-beremembered words during the retention interval

is a function

of the probability of the word being experienced in everyday usage.

Thus, due to less interference, Jess forgetting

during the retention interval might be expected for lowfrequency as opposed to high frequency words.

,

I'
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Method
Design.

The present experiment consisted of present-

ing subjects with a list of words, half in the A modality,
and half in the V modality.
employed,

Four basic sets of words were

representing the factorial combination of high

and low background frequency with high and low concreteness.
Following either a 0 or 24 hr.

retention interval, subjects

were tested for recognition memory by means of a forcedchoice procedure and for memory for modality by means of a
yes/no procedure.
Word pools.
experiment.

A total of 142 words was used in the

One set of 128 words comprised the experimental

items; the remaining 14 were those items to be used in the
primacy and recency buffers.
presented the factorial

The experimental

items re-

combination of background frequency

(high or low) and concreteness (high or low).

Thus, there

were 32 high frequency-low concreteness items, 32 high
frequency-high concreteness items, 32 low frequency-low
concreteness
items.

item~,

and 32 low frequency-high concreteness

High frequency words were defined as those occuring

at least 50 or more times per million (A and AA), and low
frequency words were defined as those occuring 15 times
or less per mill ion in the Thorndike and Lorge (1944) G
count.

High concreteness words were defined as those

ranging from 5.07 to 7.00 on the seven point scales used
by Spreen and Schulz (1966) and Paivio, Yuille and Madigan

,
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(1968).

Low

concretdo~ss;words

were defined as those

having values of from 1.28 to 2.95.
Study list constructions and presentation procedure.
Each subject was presented a single 1 ist of 80 words presented one time each.

The first and last 7 words comprised

the primacy and recency buffers.
represented in the test list.

These words were not

Two sets of 64 words were

formed from the pool of 128 experimental words previously
described.

For one-half of the subjects, one set of words

was presented in the study 1 ist while the remaining set of
words comprised the distractor items to be used in the
test 1 ist.

For the remaining half of the subjects, the

function of these two sets of words was reversed.

Of the 64 experimental items presented in the study
1 ist, 16 were randomly chosen from each set of 32 words
that represented the four possible combinations of high
and low frequency and high and low concreteness.

Thus, each

subject was presented 16 high frequency-high concreteness
items, 16 high frequency-low concreteness items, 16 low
frequency-low concreteness items, and 16 low frequencyhigh concreteness items.
Modality of presentation was manipulated as
first experiment with all
rate.

in the

items being presented at a 6 sec.

The modality in which a particular item was presented

was counterbalanced across subjects.

Thus, four different

study 1 ists were constructed; each item being used equally
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often as a distractor item in the test I ist and a to-beremembered item in the study list, and equally often in the
A and V mod a 1 i t i e s .
The assignment of the experimental words to the 1 ist
positions was random with two restrictions.

First, no more

than two items in the same modality were presented consecutively.

Second, each block of 16 items in the study 1 ist

comprised two instances of each possible combination of
mod a 1 i t y (A or V) w i t h 1 eve 1 of f r e que n c y ( h i g h or 1ow) and
level of concreteness (high or low).

Since there were 64

items presented in the study 1 ist, there were 4 blocks of
16 items.
Manipulation of retention interval.

The elapsed

time between the end of presentation of the study 1 ist and
the beginning of the test list was varied such that onehalf of the subjects were tested immediately following
presentation of the study I ist and one-half of the subjects
were required to return for testing following a 24 hr.
interval.
Test pairs.
words.

The test 1 ist comprised 64 pairs of

Each pair comprised one word previously presented

on the study 1 ist and one word not previously presented.
It will be remembered that there were 64 experimental words
presented in the study I ist and that there were 8 experimental words for each combination of input modality, background frequency, and level of

con~reten~ss.

Each of these
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items was paired with a distractor item on the test 1 ist.
Further, each type of word was paired with a distractor
word that was drawn from the same word source.

Thus, for

example, high frequency-high concreteness to-be-remembered
items were paired with high frequency-high concreteness
distractor items.

Within the above restrictions, the

pairings of study and distractor items was randomly determined.
Test procedure.

The instructions given to the

subjects and the manner in which the test was administered
to them was identical to that of the first experiment.
Subjects.

A total of 60 subjects were participants

in the present experiment.

All subjects were required to

attend two experimental sessions.

The data for those

subjects who did not do so were subsequently not considered
in the evaluation of the results.

Hence, there were 32

subjects providing usable data, half of whom were tested
during the first session, and half of whom were tested for
the first time during a second session following the first
between 22 and 26 hr.

later.

All subjects were run and

tested in groups of size 2-4.
Results
Recognition performance.

The mean recognition

probabilities were calculated as in Experiment I.

As can

be seen in Table 7, recognition performance was high for
the group tested immediately following presentation of the

1

Table 7
Mean Proportion Correct Recognition
High Frequency Words
Abstract
Concrete

Low Frequency Words
Abstract
Concrete

Modality

A

v

A

v

A

Immediate
Group

.73

. 75

. 80

. 71

. 91

. 80 . 93

. 86

Delayed
Group

.60

. 64

. 63

.65

• 77

.69 . 79

. 70
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study 1 ist
F (1 ,30)

=

ex=

.81) than for the delayed group

ex=

.69)'

166.84, E.< .001, and was higher for low fre-

quency than for high frequency words (X's
respectively),

f.

(1,30)

=

29.39, E. <.01.

=

.81 and .69

Using the .05

confidence 1 eve], no other effects or interact ions were
significant.

The entire Analysis of Variance is summarized

in Table 4 of the Appendix.
Modality judgments.

As in Experiment I, each sub-

ject's data were conditional ized on correct recognition.
,I

Further,

it should be noted that the high versus ]ow fre-

quency comparisons were calculated separately from the
abstract versus concrete comparisons.

That is, the fre-

quency level comparisons were computed collapsed over the
concreteness-abstractness dimension, and the latter comparisons were computed collapsed over the two frequency
levels.

The reason for this particular form of analysis

was that there were an insufficient number of observations
per subject upon which an adequate judgment might be made
with respect to the presence of any interaction between
the abstractness/concreteness dimension and the background
frequency dimension.
High versus low frequency comparisons.

As in

Experiment I, the data were analyzed treating error type
as a treatment variable in the Analysis of Variance along
with input modality and frequency as within-subject factors
and retention interval as a between-subjects factor.
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The main effect of retention interval,
19.29, £. <.01, frequency,
error type,

f

(1,30)

=

f

(1,30)

=

f

(1,30)

=

21.00, £. <.01, and

7.20, £. <.05, were significant.

As can be seen in Table 8, the latter two effects are the
result of a greater proportion of errors for high frequency
than low frequency words cx•s

=

.36 and .26 respectively)'

and a greater proportion of FA's than M's (X's
.27 respectively).
were significant.

= .35

and

No other main effects or interactions
The entire Analysis of Variance is sum-

marized in Table 5 of the Appendix.
As was the case in Experiment I,

it is not neces-

sarily clear as to the extent to which these results might
be the effect of response biases either masking or producing
differences between conditions.

As a general test of the

adequacy of the measures of response bias developed in
Chapter IV, the same set of correlations detailed in that
chapter were computed for the second experiment as well.
It should be noted that these correlations were computed
on data collapsed over both the frequency and abstractnessconcreteness dimensions.

As was the case in Experiment I,

the correlations between the (M-FA)/(M+FA) measure and
Beta computed separately for each modality were high and
significant, ranging from .81 to .94 with an average of .87.
The Spearman rank-order correlations were also high,
1\

r

from .80 to .93 with an average of .87.
case in the previous chapter,

ranging

Hence, as was the

it may be concluded that the

..

1
Table 8
Mean Probability Error
High Frequency Words
Miss

False Alarm

Low Frequency Words
Miss

Fa 1 s e A1 arm

Immediate
Group
A-Mode
V-Mode

•27
• 19

.37
-35

• 18
• 17

• 22

.26
.36

.33
. 41

• 18

Delayed
Group
A-Mode
V-Mode

.40
.35

.so

.48

""-!
N
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(M-FA)/(M+FA) measure is indicative of the same general
phenomenon as is the signal detection measure Beta.
Correlations were also computed between the measures
of A and V bias obtained by subtracting the (M-FA)/(M+FA)
measure as computed collapsed over each subject's entire
data from the same measure computed on the basis of each
modality questioned.

The reader may recall

that these

correlations are predicted to be negative on the grounds
that any form of A bias would logically seem to be the
obverse of V bias.
highly negative,

~·s

As predicted, these correlations were

= -.96

delayed groups respectively.

and -.98 for the immediate and
Hence, as was argued earlier,

measures of A and V response biases may be derived that are
essentially independent of general biases to say "yes" or
"no".
Composite scores representing measures free of
response biases were computed for each subject separately
for each modality and each level of background frequency.
These composite scores were derived in the same manner as
in the first experiment, namely, by subtracting each subject's

~-score

representing his A and V response biases

from that subject's
rates.

~-score

representing his A and V error

The mean composite scores thus computed are presented

in Table 9.

In agreement with the analysis of the uncor-

rected scores, low frequency words were judged correctly
more often than were high frequency words, F (1,30)

=

17.60,

-· ---· - - --

Table 9
Mean Composite Scores
High Frequency Words

Low Frequency Words

A-Mode

V-Mode

A-Mode

V-Mode

Immediate
Group

+.02

-.02

-.62

-.82

Delayed
Group

+.61

+.79

-.07

+. 11

........
~

75

R

<.01, and as would be expected, performance was higher
group,~

in the immediate group than in the delayed
14.23, £ <.01.
nificant.

(1,30)

=

No other effects or interactions were sig-

The entire Analysis of Variance is summarized

in Table 6 of the Appendix.
Concrete versus abstract words.

Preliminary analyses

were conducted using error type as a treatment factor.

As

expected, there were no effects significant in this analysis
that were not significant in the analysis of high versus
low frequency words.

Also, as expected, both the main

effects of error type,£. (1,30)
tion interval,£. (1,30)

=

=

10.20, £ <.01, and reten-

24.00, £ <.01 were significant.

The entire Analysis of Variance is summarized in Table 7 of
the Appendix.
Composite scores were computed in the same fashion
as reported above with the obvious exception that the bias
scores were computed based on the abstractness/concreteness
dimension.

The mean composite scores are presented by con-

dition in table 11.

The only main effect to achieve sig-

nificance was that of retention

interval,~

(1,30)

=

14.44,

In addition, the Modality X Retention Interval
interaction was also

significant,~

(1,30)

=

5.59, £ <.05.

This interaction is the result of higher V than A performance for the immediate group with the opposite holding
true for the delayed group.

As this comparison was not

significant in the analysis comparing high and low frequency

1
Table 10
Mean Probability Error
Abstract Words

Concrete Words

Miss

Miss

False Alarm

Fa 1s e A1arm

Immediate
Group
A-Mode
V-Mode

.27
• 19

.33
. 31

. 16
. 17

.21
. 23

• 31
.37

.40
.43

.29
• 34

• 45
.46

De 1 ayed
Group
A-Mode
V-Mode

'-1

"'

1
Table 11
Mean Composite Scores
Abstract Words

Concrete Words

A-Mode

V-Mode

A-Mode

V-Mode

Immediate
Group

-. 0 8

-.36

-.04

-.72

De 1 ayed
Group

+.28

+.45

+.08

+.76

........

........

6-~---
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words, and is only marginally significant in the present
analysis, there does not seem to be any justifiable interpretation.

The entire Analysis of Variance is summarized

in Table 8 of the Appendix.
A Mathematical Model
The results of a series of goodness of fit tests
with respect to the mathematical model developed by Anderson
and Bower (1972) were reported in the previous chapter.
reader may recall

The

that the results of the tests did not

permit a distinction between the Anderson and Bower model
and two alternative signal detection models.

The failure

to find clear empirical support for the Anderson and Bower
model does not necessarily indicate that the concept of a
prepositionally based memory structure is innacurate, but
rather; suggests that the specifics of the model are insufficient to describe the data.

Thus, one purpose of the

present section is to describe a variant of the model proposed by Anderson and Bower and to compare the two formulations in terms of their goodness of fit to the data from
Experiment I I.
The distinction between the presently proposed model
and that offered by Anderson and Bower 1 ies in the manner in
which subjects process information not directly referred to
in the task instructions.

With respect to the present ex-

periments, for example, the Anderson and Bower model suggests that .all distractor items and items presented in the

r
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modality not questioned are denoted by the same distribution.
This implies that when subjects are asked whether a V item
was presented in the A mode, subjects attempt to retrieve
only information that is relevant to the item having been
presented in the A modality.

Common sense, however, would

seem to suggest that subjects might often answer such a
question through the retrieval of information that the item
was presented in the V mode.
section of this chapter, then,

The purpose of the present
is to describe a model which

directly takes such an observation into account.
It would thus seem inappropriate to treat distractor
items as being distributed identically to items not presen ted i n the mod a l i t y que s t ion e d .

Mo r e spec i f i c a 1 I y ,

the

present model suggests that it is appropriate to treat the
data from the present experiments as being represented by
three distributions, one representing A items, one representing V items, and a third representing distractor items.
These three distributions can be considered to 1 ie along
a single dimension that may be 1 ikened to an AuditoryVisual scale; one end of the continuum represents a visual
end-state (Gardner, 1973), and the other end of the continuum represents an auditory end state.

The three dis-

tributions are assumed to based on the parameters a and u
as in the Anderson and Bower model.
Anderson and Bower (1973),

Further,

m

in line with

it is assumed that when asked

a particular question, an initial representation of that

p
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question is formed in a propositional format, and a match
for the resulting representation is sought in memory.
The nature of the likelihood distributions on the
decision scale, however, depend on both the distributions
described above, and also on the probability that a subject
will test alternative propositions to that indicated by the
questions asked of tehm.

Thus, for example, the shape of

the 1 ikel ihood distribution of V items on an A 1 ikel ihood
scale, f

v.a

(x),

is a function of the distribution of evi-

dence for V items on the Auditory-Visual scale and also
on the probab i 1 i ty A , that a subject wi 11 test propositions
v
concerning the V modality when asked about the auditory
modality, or

( 2)

f

v.a

(x)

=

Av f

v

(x) + ( 1 - A ) f (x).
v n

It should be noted that f (x) and f (x)
v

n

represent the dis-

tributions of V and distractor items on the AuditoryVisual scale.

The equation is based on the observation

that if subjects did not check their memory as to whether
a V item was presented visually, the V item so tested
would have the same likelihood of having been presented
auditorily as a distractor item falsely recognized.

Simi-

larly, the likelihood distribution of A items on the V
1 ike 1 i hood s ca 1 e is
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f

(3)

a.v

(x)

=

A f (x) + (1 - A ) f (x).
a a
a n

A simple test of this alternative model can be conducted in a manner similar to that of Experiment I.

Confi-

dence ratings were grouped into five categories and the
four criteria separating the categories were determined by
calculating the standard normal deviates as reported in the
previous chapter.

A chi-square minimization technique was

used to find the best fitting parameters for the signal
distribution.

The present case differs from that reported

in the previous chapter in that these criterion estimates
were based on the distribution of confidence ratings to the
i terns not

pres en ted in the mod a 1 i ty questioned.

Both the signal-detection model
and the Anderson and Bower model
presented in Table 12.

parameter estimates

parameter estimates are

Clearly, the one parameter signal

detection model does not describe the data very well.
Further, similar to the results of the first experiment,
both the two

para~eter

signal detection model and the

Anderson and Bower model

fit the data fairly well.

There

are no significant chi-squares at the .05 level for either
model.

Also, however, there is ·a small but consistent

superiority of the two parameter signal detection model
over the Anderson and Bower model.
The second part of the test of the present model
relates to the shape of the distribution of·the V items on

1
Table 1 2
Parameter Estimates and Resultant Chi-Square Values
Standard One-Parameter
Signal Detection Model
Group

x

X

2

Two-Parameter
Signal Detection Model
X

C1

X

2

Anderson and Bower
Model

a

ll

xz

Immediate
Mode
Hi Frequency A .59
Hi Frequency V .99

45.95
28.54

Lo Frequency A . 85
Lo Frequency V 1.03
Del

1. 21

4.43

.44
.59

4. 1 0
2.26

5.78
5.08

2.23
2. 1 7

0. 1 7
.59

.59
. 63

3.40
2.75

4. 79
3.35

1. 43

2.03
1. 65

58.66
56.12

1. 97
2.02

1. 42

a~

Hi Frequency A
Hi Frequency V

.23
. 38

8.37
4.85

.29
.42

1. 35
1. 24

2. 1 3
1. 22

. 19
.29

2.23
1. 53

3. 71
1. 4 7

Lo Frequency A
Lo Frequency V

. 80
. 42

4. 1 3
16.94

.95
.56

1 . 28
1. 52

.35

. 61
. 32

1 . 52

1. 65

1. 94

.24
5. 1 3

00
N
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the A 1 ikel ihood scale, the A distribution on the V 1 ikel ihood scale.

The model outlined by Anderson and Bower pre-

dicts that these distributions will have the same mean and
variance (0,1) as the likelihood distribution of distractor
items.

The chi-square tests appropriate to the Anderson

and Bower model each have four degrees of freedom and are
summarized in the first column of Table 13.

The alternative

mode 1 out 1 i ned above s u g g e s t s that the 1 i k e 1 i hood d i s t r i bution of A items on the V likelihood scale will have the
same variance and mean (but opposite in sign) as the
1 ikel ihood distribution of A items on the A 1 ikel ihood
scale.

A similar case can be made for V items.

The result-

ant chi-squares each have three degrees of freedom due to
the Joss of one degree of freedom through the estimation of
the parameter A.

The results of these tests are clear.

There is a clear superiority for the general

type of model

out 1 i ned above.
The results of the tests are equivocal, however,
with respect to an absolute test of the overall model.
Certainly, however,

lower chi-squares would be obtained if

both likelihood distributions of a particular modality were
fit to the data simultaneously.

Unfortunately, however,

the additional computer time to make such a test would be
hundreds of times greater than was needed to obtain the
paramet~r

estimates in the present fashion.

It is interesting to note that the model fits the

1
Table 1 3
Chi-Square Values for Two Alternative Models
Anderson and Bower Model

2

Condition

X

Proposed Model
A

x2

Immediate
Hi Frequency A
Hi Frequency V

213.89
113.54

. 97
.76

10.68
24.09

Lo Frequency A
Lo Frequency v

358.90
268.27

.94
. 97

5.84
3.65

Hi Frequency A
Hi Frequency v

3 . 31
34.29

.02
.77

4.61
27.20

Lo Frequency A
Lo Frequency V

13.24
53.36

.69
. 67

1. 16
12.24

De I aye d

(X)

.s::-

,
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data for the low frequency words much more accurately than
it fits the data for the high frequency words.

This result

may be attributed to the fact that high frequency words
have,

in general, a greater number of senses than do low

frequency words (Reder, Anderson

&

Bjork, 1974), and hence,

are more subject to encoding failures (Anderson & Bower,
1974).
In sum, then, the present results strongly imply
that subjects access representations in memory other than
those required by the question asked of them by the experimenter.

The conditions under which this question answering

might be shown to vary remains to be specified.
Discussion
The results of Experiment I I indicate that memory
for mod a 1 i t y i s i n f 1 u en c e d by at 1 e as t one c h a r act e r i s t i c
of the stimulus materials.

Specifically, memory for modal-

ity is clearly superior for low frequency words than for
high frequency words.

As was pointed out by Kirsner (1974),

if a literal copy, or perceptual code is the basis for
subjects

1

modality judgments, the retrieval of the infor-

mation in that code should be independent of any of the
properties of that item which characterize its lexical
status in memory.

Landauer and Streeter (1973), however,

have shown that low frequency words are more "different"
from other low frequency words than high frequency words
are different from other high

freq~ency

words.

More speclfi-

I

jiP
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cally, these authors demonstrated that high frequency words
are more similar to other high frequency words on both the
graphemic and phonemic dimensions than are low frequency
words to other low frequency words.
Experiment I,

Given the results of

it appears unlikely that the graphemic and

phonemic word characteristics could differentially affect
the quality of an "image".

Specifically, there are a

number of studies extant in the 1 iterature that have
demonstrated a superiority of phonemic as opposed to
graphemic memory codes (cf. Posner

&

Warren, 1972).

Thus,

if memory for modality for V items is dependent upon memory
for graphemic codes, while memory for modality for A items
is dependent upon phonemic codes, an advantage would be
expected for A as opposed to V items.

That this result

was not obtained in either of the present experiments or
in any of the experiments previously reported in the 1 iterature would seemingly case doubt on a hypothesis attributing memory for modality to the retention of the graphemic
and phonemic codes per

~·

The failure to find an effect of the abstract/
concrete dimension on either recognition memory or memory
for modality is surprising, particularly in the 1 ight of
the results obtained by Gorman (1961).

There does not

seem to be any immediate explanation for this discrepancy.
The mechanism responsible for the forgetting of
modality information is not readily apparent.

The hypo-

,
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thesis outlined earlier which suggested that forgetting
should be inversely related to frequency of word usage is
clearly not supported in the present data.

Thus, the most

parsimonious explanation of forgetting of modality informat ion may simply be one of ••trace decay•• (Wickelgren, 1972).
It is interesting to note, however, that the present
res u 1 t s demons t r a t e a subs tan t i a 1 memory for mod a 1 i t y even
following a 24 hr. delay.
In sum, the results of the present experiment seemingly support the notion that an abstract representation
of modality serves as the basis upon which subjects judge
modality of presentation.

At the same time, however, one

specific model of the abstract representation, that offered
by Anderson and Bower (1972)
Integration

~Experiments

is not supported by the data.

land _1_1

The results of the two experiments are consistent
with the notion that the memory representation of modality
information is at least in part abstract or propositional
in nature.

The reader may recall that either of two

general hypotheses can account for both the salient results
of the present experiments and those previously reported
in the 1 iterature.
either a

11

Specifically,

it was suggested that

dual-representation 11 hypothesis or an

11

encoding-

facilitation•• hypothesis can account for the present data
and the results of the Kirsner (1974) and Hintzman and
Summers (1973) studies.
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The key distinction between the encoding facilitation
hypothesis and the dual-representation hypothesis 1 ies in
the manner in which the hypotheses account for the failure
to find an effect of the similarity manipulation on modality
judgments.

The encoding facilitation hypothesis accounts

for this failure on the basis of the fact that while modality judgments are based on the retrieval of abstract infermation, presenting an item in the same physical

format on

both study and test occasions results in the facilitation
in the lexical encoding of the item at the time of test.
That is, given recognition (and therefore, presumably,
encoding of the item), modality judgments are not expected
to be affected by the similarity manipulation.
The dual-representation hypothesis, on the other
hand, suggests that both perceptual codes and abstract
propositions may form the basis of modality judgments; the
representation utilized by subjects depending in part on
the nature of the task.
of course,

is

so~ewhat

The dual-representation hypothesis,
difficult to test since any failure

to find an effect of a manipulation such as that employed

.;

in Experiment I is handled by resorting to the explanation
that an abstract code was utilized in that instance .
Recent evidence offered by Kirsner and Smith (1974),
however, would seem to favor the dual-representation hypothesis.

In that study, a word identification paradigm was

employed where subjects were shown a series-of words and

jiiiP
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non-words and were asked to classify each item as to whether
or not it was in fact a word.
twice.

Each item was presented

Further, the physical format of the stimuli was

either the same or different on both presentation occasions.
The results indicated that the time for item identification
was faster when the physical formats were the same on both
occasions as opposed to when they were different.

Moreover,

this effect was of approximately the same magnitude for
both words and non-words.

The Kirsner and Smith results

may thus be taken as evidence for the dual

representation

hypothesis since if the effect was due to the process of
activating the item in the lexicon, the effect of the
similarity manipulation would not be expected for non-words.
Thus, the results of the Kirsner and Smith study taken in
conjunction'with the results of the present experiments
would seem to argue in favor of a dual-representation
notion.
Finally,

it is tempting to speculate that the per-

ceptual code that is sometimes available to subjects is an
image-1 ike entity involving the auditory and visual
perceptual systems.

There remains, however, a number of

difficulties with this conceptualization.

Specifically,

recent arguments offered by Baylor (1972) and Pylyshlyn
(1973) suggest that the representation of the "image"
itself is

prop~sitional

or abstract in nature.

These

arguments have proceeded on the gro-unds that images are

90
explicable in terms of certain network models where images
are functional or procedural

representations of the envi-

ronment (e.g., Winograd, 1972).
experience of an

11

Thus, the introspective

image'' does not constitute evidence of

a perceptual system being involved except to the extent
that a basic procedural

representation, which itself

cannot be open to introspect ion, underlies both the image
in the

11

mind's eye 11 and the image arising through the

act of perception.

Thus, the image may refer to nothing

more than a particular abstract form of representation
common to both memorial and perceptual systems.
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Table
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for
Recognition Data (Experiment 1 )

ss

df

Total

2. 0 1

19 1

Subjects

1. 12

95

Source

Instructions
( Ins)

.00

Interpolated
Materials
( In t)

. 12

Ins X In t

MS

F

.00

.00

2

. 06

5. 3 5

.02

2

•01

.90

-Ss w/g roups

. 98

90

. 01

Modality (M)

.01

. 01

1 . 44

M X Ins

.01

. 01

1. 44

M X lnt

.00

2

.00

.00

M X lnt X Ins

.02

2

•0 1

.88

MX

. 85

90

~s/grps

.009

10 1
Table 2
Analysis of Variance Summary Table
Error Data (Experiment 1 )

ss

Source
Total
(.?_s)

Subjects

(Ins)

Instructions

Interpolated
Materials ( In t)
Ins

X lnt

Ss w/g roups

df

2 0. 1 0

383

6.38

95

.02

for

MS

F

.02

. 34

.64

2

.32

5.33

.06

2

.03

. 91

5.66

90

.06

.02

.02

. 33

M X Ins

.01

. 01

. 17

M X lnt

.05

2

.03

.so

X lnt

.30

2

. 15

2.67

M X Ss w/g rps

5.53

90

.06

Modality

M X Ins

(M)

-

.06

.06

1 . 20

E X Ins

.02

.02

.40

E X In t

.02

2

. 01

.20

X tnt

. 10

2

.05

1 . 00

E X ~s/groups

4.06

90

.05

Error Type

E X Ins

(E)

M X E

.04

.04

1. 00

M X E X Ins

.00

.00

.00

M X E X lnt

.20

2

. 10

4.00

X tnt

.01

2

. 01

.03

M X E X ~s/g roups

3.25

90

.04

M X E X Ins
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for
Recognition Data (Experiment 1)

ss

Source

df

Total

1 79.9 7

19 1

Subjects

139.76

95

Instructions
(Ins)

.02

Interpolated
Materials
(In t)

10.40

2

50

2

127.83

90

Ins

-Ss

X

In t

w/groups

Modality (M)

1.

MS

.02

.34

5.2

. 75
1.

F

. 01
3.67
.53

42

.34

. 83

39

3.45

M X Ins

1.

M X lnt

1. 62

2

. 81

2.03

M X Ins X lnt

.73

2

. 37

.92

Ss w/g rp X M

36. 13

90

.40

39

1.
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Table 4
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for
Recognition Data (Experiment 2)

ss

Source
Total

8.45

Subjects (Ss)

1. 19

Retention
Interval ( R)

1. 01

df

MS

F

31
1. 01

166.84

-Ss w/groups

. 18

Frequency (F)

.89

. 89

29.39

R X F

•0 1

•0 1

.33

F X

~s/grps

. 91

30

30

.006

.03

Modality (M)

. 12

. 12

3.00

R X M

.02

.02

.so

MX

~s/grps

1. 16

30

.04

Abstractness (A)

.03

.03

1 . 00

R X A

.00

.00

.00

A X Ss/g rps

•91

A X M

~

01

.01

.so

R X A X M

.00

.00

.00

A X MX

~s/grps

. 70

30

30

.03

.02

A X F

.00

.00

.00

R X A X F

.00

.00

.00

A X F X Ss/grps

• 72

F X A X M

.02

.02

.67

R X F X A X M

.02

.02

.67

A X F X M X

~s/grp

.]6

30

30

.02

.03

l
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Table

5

Analysis of Variance Summary Table
Error Data (Experiment 2)

ss

Source

14.46

255

(~s)

3.40

31

( R)

1. 35

Total
Subjects
Retention
Interval
~s

df

2.05

w/groups

MS

1.

30

35

for

F

19. 29

.07

.63

.63

21 . 00

R X F

.00

.00

.00

F X ~s/grps

0

(F)

F req uen cy

(M)

Modality
R X M

30

.00

.00

.03

.03

.38

30

.43

(E)

R X E

l. 80

.08
43

.72

.00

.00

0

oOO

E X .?_s/g rps

.03

.00

2.53

M X ~s/grpso
Error Type

97

30

.06

F X M

. 13

. 13

3.25

R X F X M

.02

.02

.so

F X M X Ss/grpso
E X F
R X E X

F

E X F X .?_s/grps.

1. 28

30

.04

.07

.07

1. 75

.03

. 03

. 75

1. 05

30

.04

E X M

. 01

. 01

.33

R X E X M

. 01

. 01

. 33

E X M X .?_s/g rps

0

.78

30.

.03
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Table 5 (con•t.)
Source

ss

E X F X M

.03

.03

. 01

.07

R

X E X F X M

E X F X MX

Ss w/g roups

1. 19

df

30

MS

.04

-F

. 75
1.

75

r
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Table 6
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for
Composite Scores (Experiment 2)

ss

Source

df

MS

F

127.42

127

Subjects (~s)

51 . 6 7

31

Retention
Interval ( R)

16. 6 5

-

Ss w/g roups

35.02

Frequency

15.84

15. 84

17.60

. 01

. 01

. 01

Total

R X F

16.65
30

14.2 3

1. 1 7

F X .?_s/g rps.

26.86

Modality (M)

.02

.02

. 03

R X M

.67

. 67

1. 03

M X Ss/grps.

19.62

30

30

.90

. 65

MX F

.05

.05

. 12

R X M X F

.05

. 05

. 12

MX F X

~s/grps.

1 2. 6 3

30

.42

r
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Table

7

Analysis of Variance Summary Table
Error Data (Experiment 2)

ss

Source
Total
Subjects

MS

14.74

255

(~s)

3.38

31

( R)

1. 44

1

1. 44

1. 94

30

.06

Retention
Interval

-Ss

df

w/g roups

Abstractness

(A)

R X A
A X ~s/grps.

for

F

24.00

. 10

. 10

2.50

.l3

. 13

3.25

1. 05

30

.04

Modality

. 01

. 01

. 10

R X M

.05

.05

.so

M X ~s/grps.
Error Type

(E)

2.92

30

. 51

. 10
. 51

10.20

.. i

R X E
E X ~s/grps

.02
1. 51

.02
30

.40

.05

A X M

.01

. 01

. 16

R X A X M

.02

.02

. 33

A X M X ~s/grps

1. 75

E X A

.00

R X E X A

.04
1. 38

E X A X ~s/grps.

E X M

30

.06
.00

.00

1

.04

.80

30

.os

.00

.00

.00

II
i I

R X E X M

.02

E X M X ~s/grps.

.99

.02
30·

I

.67
:I

.03
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Table 7 (con't.)
Source

ss

E X A X M

.01

•01

.33

.00

.00

.00

R

X E X A X M

df

MS

E X A X MX

Ss w/groups

• 84

30

.03

F.

109
Table 8
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for
Composite Scores (Experiment 2)

ss

Source

df

124.49

127

Subjects

61 . 90

31

Retention
Interval ( R)

20.07

Ss w/groups

41 . 83

Total

-

Modality (M)
R X M
MX

~s/grps.

Abstractness (A)
R X A
A X

~s/grps.

MS

20.07
30

1.

F

14.44

39

. 16

. 16

.22

4.03

4.03

5.59

21 . 68

30

. 72

. 71

. 71

.83

1. 37

1. 37

1 . 59

25.88

30

.86

MX A

. 51

. 51 .

1 . 96

R X M X A

.sa

.58

2.23

MX A X

~s/grps.

7.67

30

.26
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